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This case was decided on summary judgment. On summary judg-
ment, plaintiffs were entitled to have the court view the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to them. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 
289, 259 P.2d 297, 298 (1953). Defendants place their own inter-
pretation on carefully selected and omitted facts, rather than 
affording plaintiffs the presumption to which plaintiffs are 
entitled. Every citation to the record in plaintiffs' principal 
Brief supports the fact asserted.1 Defendants' extensive and 
•""The following is a short and incomplete list illustrating some of the areas 
in which defendants simply ignore disputed facts and draw inferences in their own 
favor instead: 
a. Defendants contend there is "absolutely no evidence" that Wiley, Quale 
and Wood met to discuss the Wiley Firm's representation of Northstar on June 11, 
1986. (Appellees' Brief, at 36-37.) The record unequivocally supports the fact 
that the meeting occurred on that date. (R. 4183, 4557, 6570, 6689, 7043.) 
b. Defendants claim Wood did not represent Northstar or plaintiffs in the 
negotiations between plaintiffs and Northstar/Allstate or in reducing the venture 
to writing. (Appellees' Brief, at 36.) Wood's time sheets show he provided 
extensive services on behalf of plaintiffs in connection with such negotiations, and 
he also represented Northstar. (R. 4557-72, 5420-26, 6689-6752, 6683-6783, 6852-
67.) His time sheets show he spent over 40 hours in representing plaintiffs during 
the three-day squeezedown in mid-November 1986. (R. 6773-75.) 
c. Defendants state that plaintiffs' assertion that "Wood knew they were 
in a terrible position because they had to pay two million dollars . . . and had no 
financing alternative available at the time [of the squeeze-down]" is false. 
(Appellees' Brief, at 36.) Defendants then state that Wood testified that it was 
plaintiffs' fault they were subject to a $2 million dollar liability under a buyout 
agreement with another station applicant. (1^.) Wood stated he knew plaintiffs 
were in a terrible position. (R. 5476-77.) In addition, the record shows 
plaintiffs first learned they were subject to personal liability during the mid-
November squeezedown when Wood informed them, after he had negotiated the very 
agreements that subjected plaintiffs to liability. (R. 5099, 5159, 5025-26, 5159-
nevertheless selective recitation of facts simply underscores the 
point that the material facts are in dispute. 
In June 1986, defendants undertook representation of North-
star, a clear conflict of interest which plaintiffs did not waive. 
This initial breach of defendants' duty set in motion a series of 
events out of which plaintiffs' injuries proximately, naturally and 
foreseeably flowed. Defendants are silent concerning those June 
1986 breaches. They attempt instead to focus the Court's attention 
solely on subsequent events. Defendants ignore completely the 
factual question of whether the later events, on which they do 
60, 5169-72, 5099, 5180-81, 5206-07.) 
d. Defendants claim plaintiffs falsely stated that the dispute between 
Wood and the Wiley Firm following the November 1986 squeezedown "had nothing to do 
with the firm's [conflict of interest] ." (Appellees' Brief, at 34.) That was 
precisely a focus of the dispute. Wood discussed the ethical issues relating to the 
conflict in detail in his memorandum to the Wiley Firm after the Firm had criticized 
him for representing plaintiffs during the squeezedown. (R. 6451-58, 6462-64, 6470-
71.) 
e. Defendants claim plaintiffs have misled the Court by stating that 
defendants represented Adams concerning the "possible purchase of Channel 13 and the 
sale of Channel 20." Defendants attempt to minimize their representation of Adams 
by stating that "Quale only spent a total of .50 hours in early 1986 on Adam's 
matter." (Appellees' Brief, at 34.) Not only do defendants admit such 
representation of Adams, but defendants' conflict record shows that when defendants 
were asked to represent Adams in connection with Channel 13, the matter "should 
appear as conflict." (R. 6291-92.) Moreover, through this representation, 
defendants knew Adams was interested in purchasing Channel 13, a fact defendants 
failed to disclose to their Utah clients, most likely because it would have impacted 
on Northstar's ability to acquire the station. (R. 4042-43, 5021-24.) 
f. Defendants claim plaintiffs falsely stated that Allstate was a client 
of the Wiley Firm in the summer of 1986. (Appellees' Brief, at 34.) Mr. Wiley's 
personal billing summary shows Allstate as a client of the Firm as early as 198 5 and 
that the Wiley Firm billed Allstate $15,620.75 for legal services through September 
1985. (R. 7048.) This was not disclosed to plaintiffs. (R. 4046.) 
g. Defendants' misstatements of the record concerning the Northstar/ 
Allstate and CPL commitments are discussed at length in text, infra. 
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focus, naturally and proximately flowed from defendants' initial 
breaches. 
In order to grant summary judgment, the lower court had to 
decide that defendants' initial breaches of their position of trust 
did not set in motion a series of events which allowed defendants 
and their other clients to take unfair advantage of plaintiffs. 
This determination could not be made without resolving numerous 
factual disputes in favor of defendants. 
Defendants also fail adequately to respond to the compelling 
policy reasons supporting the standard of causation plaintiffs 
advance. In a case such as this which involves an attorney's 
breach of fiduciary duties, the "but for" standard is incongruent 
with the purpose of the remedy. Even under the "reasonable 
likelihood" standard defendants advance, plaintiffs have shown many 
genuine issues of material fact concerning a better business 




A. Required Level of Proof. 
Defendants fail to recognize that the causation standard 
applicable in breach of fiduciary duty cases is not the same as the 
standard applicable in mere negligence cases. Breach of fiduciary 
duty is not carelessness. It is intentional misconduct which the 
law treats as equivalent to fraud. 
Attorneys hold the most sensitive position of trust recognized 
in the law. Attorney-client relations work best when the lawyer is 
the client's most trusted confidant. A client's remedy for a 
breach of that trust must respond to accommodate the devastation 
the breach causes. One effect may well be impairment of the 
client's ability to prove a better business result. Courts there-
fore recognize that when the highest duties of trust are involved, 
there must be a relaxed standard of causation. When the attorney 
self deals, appropriates a client opportunity for himself or for 
defendants' claim that this point was raised for the first time on appeal is 
wrong. In their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs 
advanced the standard by quoting at length from Spector v. Mermelstein. 361 F. Supp. 
30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), and the Second Circuit's affirmance at 485 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 
1973) . Plaintiffs there advanced the identical standard they advance here: "The 
essential issue is whether the conduct of the defendant was a material element or 
a substantial factor in bringing about the loss." .Id. at 48 0-81 (emphasis 
supplied). (R. 4023-26.) The issue was raised numerous times, stated in alternative 
ways, opposed by defendants and ruled upon by the district court. (R. 3365-67, 
3937-39, 4007-08, 4016-29, 7142-57, 12725, 12729-30, 12736-39, 12740-53, 12754-55, 
12763-67, 12783-84, 12786-88, 12803-05 and 12376-77.) 
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others, or advances the interests of one client to the detriment of 
another, it is the attorney, not the client, who should bear the 
risk of a deal gone bad or of uncertainty. Highlands Ins. v. 
National Union Fire Ins.. 27 F.3d 1027 (5th Cir. 1994)3; Milbank. 
Tweed. Hadley & McCloy v. Boon. 13 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 1994); Spector 
v. Mermelstein. 361 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'dr 485 F.2d 
474 (2d Cir. 1973).4 
Contrary to defendants' claim, this standard has everything to 
do with preserving the right of a client to trust his lawyer, and 
nothing to do with the lawyer becoming guarantor of a venture. If 
this were a negligence case, defendants' argument might have merit. 
Here, however, defendants engaged in intentional misconduct which 
the law equates with actual fraud. When the lawyer chooses to 
3In Highlands. National, a primary carrier, failed to disclose the full extent 
of its coverage to Highlands, the excess carrier in breach of its fiduciary duty. 
As a result, Highlands agreed to a settlement under the belief that its exposure was 
greater than it actually was. Highlands testified it would have acted differently 
had it been provided complete information. While a risk of similar liability 
existed, Highlands successfully argued that the risk was less than originally 
thought due to National's failure to disclose in violation of its fiduciary duty. 
(Likewise, plaintiffs here testified that with complete information, they would have 
pursued a different course.) The Highlands court applied the "substantial factor" 
standard but found sufficient evidence of causation under both standards. .Id. at 
1031 (citing Milbank). 
4The situation is similar to that in an antitrust case in which the defen-
dant's anticompetitive conduct makes it difficult to prove what business result 
would have obtained absent the illegal conduct. In such cases, the courts also 
recognize that strict "but for" causation should not be required. There, courts 
"observe the practical limits of the burden of proof which may be demanded of a 
treble-damage plaintiff who seeks recovery for injuries from a partial or total 
exclusion from a market; damage issues in these cases are rarely susceptible of the 
kind of concrete, detailed proof of injury which is available in other contexts." 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research. 395 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1969) . 
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defraud his client, it is appropriate to charge him with all losses 
which he substantially causes. Wiley, Rein & Fielding did not get 
itself into this position by accident. All plaintiffs must show is 
that the breach was a substantial factor in the outcome, and in the 
present case there are genuine issues of material fact in this 
regard. Requiring more would shift the risks of lawyer dishonesty 
from the lawyer to the client.5 
B. Material Disputed Facts Concerning Causation. 
Defendants refuse to recognize the seriousness of their 
breaches. They treat their breaches as though plaintiffs took a 
known risk in a simple arms-length business deal and lost. 
5Most of defendants' cases are inapposite. Stansbery v. Schroeder, 226 Neb. 
492, 412 N.W.2d 447, 499-500 (1987), Williams v. Barber. 765 P.2d 887 (Utah 1988), 
and Dunn, McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894 (Utah 1978) are 
malpractice claims based on negligence. Mitchell v. Pierson Enterprises, 6 97 P.2d 
24 0 (Utah 1985) is a wrongful death case based on negligence. Johnson v. Jones. 103 
Idaho 702, 652 P. 2d 650 (Idaho 1982) , did not define the standard of proximate 
cause. There, the trial court had found no attorney-client relationship, and thus 
no duty. Moreover, the plaintiff agreed the attorney had properly, fairly and 
competently drafted the contract as contemplated by the parties, which the other 
party had breached. Finally, plaintiff produced no evidence that would have 
satisfied either standard of causation. In Faucett v. American Resources Management 
Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234 (D. Utah 1982), (1) the case did not include an attorney-
client relationship, (2) defendant was not a fiduciary at the time of the alleged 
breach, and (3) the court did not define proximate cause. Moreover, the court's 
language supports the standard of causation plaintiffs advance: "Any action by a 
corporate officer which diminishes the value of that asset would be a breach of 
fiduciary duty for which the officer should be liable." Id. at 1241. 
Yusefzadeh v. Ross, 932 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1991) , supports an assertion that 
a "but for" standard should apply in an attorney malpractice case based on breach 
of fiduciary duty. The facts, however, are easily distinguished. There, the 
attorney was not representing adverse interests, except his own. Moreover, 
plaintiff had no leads for financing a venture, and had been turned down by three 
potential sources. The attorney also had not induced the client to turn down any 
proposed commitments so he or another client would get the advantage. Finally, the 
attorney had not aided and abetted his client's adversary in reducing or withdrawing 
a commitment. 
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Defendants' argument suggests plaintiffs should never have relied 
upon their lawyers' inducements and should have preserved other 
options until the last minute. 
By breaching their duty of full disclosure and informed 
consent in June 1986, defendants deprived plaintiffs of the right 
to make an informed decision concerning how the representation 
would proceed.6 Here, Wiley and his Firm made the decision, with-
out their other clients' knowledge or consent, to represent North-
star/Allstate. Had plaintiffs been given full disclosure, the 
record is undisputed that defendants' representation of Northstar/ 
Allstate and plaintiffs would have ceased immediately. (Appel-
lants' Brief, at 8.) Plaintiffs would have known that the duty of 
loyalty defendants owed them was in jeopardy, and would have taken 
steps to protect themselves by seeking financing from other sources 
and by securing other counsel. (Id. at 5-8.) 
The Wiley Firm in 1985 had given plaintiffs the assurance that 
in the event of a conflict in representing two clients, the Firm 
would withdraw from representing either client. (Id. at 4.) Even 
as of the present, no such withdrawal, formal or informal, written 
6It remains undisputed that at no time leading up to or during the initial 
breaches of defendants' duties of full disclosure and informed consent were 
plaintiffs represented by other counsel. (Appellants' Brief, at 9-11.) Wood and 
the Wiley Firm continued to represent plaintiffs in all matters relating to Channel 
13. (Id.) 
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or oral, occurred respecting any of plaintiffs' interests.7 After 
plaintiffs objected to defendants' request to represent Northstar/ 
Allstate, plaintiffs understood the adverse representation would 
not occur, and had no reason to think defendants' duties of loyalty 
and confidentiality to them were in jeopardy. (id. at 5-8.) 
The undisputed evidence is that Wood and the Wiley Firm 
continued to represent plaintiffs throughout the summer and fall of 
1986 and through the squeezedown. (Id. at 8-15.) The Wiley Firm's 
ongoing representation of plaintiffs was consistent with plain-
tiffs' understanding and belief that defendants would not represent 
Northstar vis-a-vis plaintiffs' interests. (Id.) 
During the months of July through November 1986, plaintiffs 
continued to look to and rely on Wood and the Wiley Firm to serve 
as counsel for plaintiffs in all matters relating to Channel 13. 
Mr. Wood's time entries relating to legal services performed for 
plaintiffs show he had numerous discussions and meetings with 
Northstar and CPL representatives and plaintiffs in the summer of 
1986. He was representing plaintiffs as he always had. 
(Appellants' Brief, at 8-10.) 
7Surely, something as significant as withdrawal from representation after five 
years, and representing a new client against the long-standing client, would merit 
a confirmatory letter or at least a memo to the file. It simply has not happened. 
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Wood and the Wiley Firm represented and advised plaintiffs in 
the selection of Northstar over CPL. The record establishes, 
unequivocally, that Wood, as plaintiffs7 attorney, induced plain-
tiffs to go with Northstar/Allstate based on their $10 million 
commitment, advised them to reject the CPL commitment, and 
personally notified CPL of plaintiffs' decision. (Id.) 
Wood and the Wiley Firm negotiated the $5 million buy-outs of 
the other applicants, which, without plaintiffs' knowledge, 
resulted in plaintiffs' personal exposure and liability. 
(Appellants' Brief, at 10-11.)8 After plaintiffs learned at the 
squeezedown of the substantial changes that had been made in 
commitment, they also discovered for the first time that they were 
personally and unconditionally liable for at least $1 million under 
one of the settlement agreements negotiated and prepared by the 
Wiley Firm on their behalf. Wood was the only lawyer in contact 
with the Utah clients during the squeezedown. (Appellants' Brief, 
at pp. 13-15.) He informed them of the changes and their personal 
exposure, and billed over 40 hours to plaintiffs during the 
November 1986 squeezedown. 
Why would Mr. Wood and the Wiley Firm negotiate agreements that exposed 
plaintiffs to such liability if no commitment from Northstar/Allstate existed? See 
discussion, infra at pp. 20-22, concerning Northstar/Allstate's commitment. 
-9-
For the first time, during the squeezedown, plaintiffs learned 
that defendants' duty of loyalty to them had been compromised. 
(Appellants' Brief, at 12-15, 17.) Defendants note in their brief 
that Wiley, Rein & Fielding lawyers were sitting beside Northstar 
and that Ralph Hardy sat with the plaintiffs. They fail to note, 
however, that Wiley, Rein & Fielding lawyer Wood represented plain-
tiffs in that same meeting and billed 40 hours to them for services 
including the meeting during that three-day period. (R. 5204, 
6773-75.) 
Defendants failed their duty affirmatively to protect plain-
tiffs7 interests and anticipate the very detrimental changes dic-
tated by Northstar/Allstate. Moreover, defendants had advised and 
directed Northstar/Allstate in a manner which impaired plaintiffs' 
interests. This conduct directly violated both components of the 
duty of loyalty (see infra, Point II) . Both David Lee and Wood 
objected to such conduct and reiterated that defendants owed 
ethical duties to plaintiffs. (Appellants' Brief at 13-14.) 
Had defendants satisfied, rather than breached, these duties, 
the outcome would clearly have been different. (Id. at 8.) Defen-
dants' breaches permitted Northstar/Allstate to withdraw the $10 
million commitment, deny they had ever made it, and change the 
terms of the transaction by, among other things, acquiring complete 
control of the venture. (Id. at 12-15.) Defendants' breaches de-
-10-
prived plaintiffs the opportunity to obtain the benefit of their 
bargain with Northstar. (Id. at 18.) Evidence establishes that 
even with $8 million, plaintiffs could have bought out the other 
applicants and placed the station in operation, and plaintiffs' 
interest would today be valued at over $20 million. (R. 6119-38.) 
An additional factor defendants fail to address is the time-
sensitivity of the squeezedown in relation to (1) plaintiffs' 
discovery that defendants had breached the duty of loyalty to them, 
(2) the requirement that partial payments of the multi-million 
dollar buy outs of other applicants be funded immediately, (3) 
plaintiffs' discovery that the Wiley Firm had exposed them 
personally and unconditionally on the agreements to buy out the 
other applicants, and (4) the absence of any alternative financing. 
What could plaintiffs do in such an emergency? Defendants' prior 
conduct had eliminated CPL and any other sources of funding from 
the equation. (Appellants' Brief at 10.) Thus, Wood advised 
plaintiffs they had no practical choice but to go forward with 
Northstar to avoid the otherwise imminent personal exposure. (Id. 
at 14.) Plaintiffs did so under extreme duress. (id. at 14-15.) 
c. Ralph Hardy's Role and its Effect, if Any, Are 
Disputed. 
Defendants' analysis concerning the effect of Mr. Hardy's in-
volvement is extremely superficial. Defendants evaluate the seven 
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transactions, out of which plaintiffs' damages occurred, as 
completely independent of each other, rather than inextricably 
linked by the initial June 1986 breaches (prior to any Hardy 
involvement) and the repeated, ongoing breaches which compounded 
the effects of the initial breaches. The causal relationship 
between the breaches and their effects is clearly a fact question. 
Defendants' conclusion that plaintiffs had independent counsel 
and advice during the critical events leading up to the squeezedown 
is disputed. Mr. Hardy was not involved in June of 1986, when 
defendants' conflict of interest arose. He was not involved in 
terminating the CPL financing commitment. He was not involved in 
exposing plaintiffs to millions of dollars of personal liability. 
One cannot reconcile the Wiley Firm's continuing representa-
tion of plaintiffs with defendants' conclusion that Hardy was 
plaintiffs' lawyer at all critical stages. Defendants would have 
been representing plaintiffs on the very matters on which Hardy 
should also have been representing them. If Hardy's role was to 
protect plaintiffs' exclusive interests in an adversary 
relationship, as defendants contend, how could he do so when 
defendants were simultaneously serving as plaintiffs' lawyer and 
representative of their adversary? 
Moreover, Hardy's hind-sight explanation concerning his role 
is clearly different from both plaintiffs' understanding and the 
-12-
evidence. Plaintiffs were never advised that Hardy was their 
lawyer vis-a-vis Northstar/Allstate. There is no evidence that any 
of the plaintiffs ever entertained the thought of engaging him as 
their lawyer prior to the squeezedown, engaged him as their lawyer 
or were informed Hardy thought he was their lawyer before the 
squeezedown. Mr. Hardy never counseled with the Utah plaintiffs. 
They never counseled with him. All plaintiffs believed he was 
financial advisor to the Foulgers.9 (Appellants7 Brief at 10-11.) 
It is undisputed that Hardy never advised plaintiffs concerning 
defendants' conflicts. (Id.) 
Only when it became apparent to the Foulgers that defendants 
had subjected them and the other plaintiffs to personal liabilities 
in excess of $1 million did the Foulger family ask Hardy to assume 
the role of legal counsel to protect the interests of Foulger. (R. 
5186-94, 5167; Appellants' Brief, at 10-11.) Thus, to the extent 
defendants claim Mr. Hardy was plaintiffs' attorney for all 
9In Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 727 (Utah App. 1990), the 
court stated a showing of an attorney-client relationship "is subjective in that a 
factor in evaluating the relationship is whether the client thought an attorney-
client relationship existed." The court further observed "it is the intent and 
conduct of the parties which is critical to the formation of the attorney-client 
relationship." ( Id. at 728.) Similarly, in Glover v. Libman. 578 F. Supp. 748, 757 
(N.D. Ga. 1983), the court stated that in determining whether an attorney-client 
relationship exists, the focus must be on the subjective expectations of the client. 
In other words, the relationship "hinges upon the client's belief that he is 
consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention to seek 
professional legal advice." Accord, Green v. Montgomery County, 784 F. Supp. 841, 
845 (M.D. Ala. 1992) . 
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purposes in plaintiffs' dealings with Northstar/Allstate, there is 
a genuine issue of material fact. 
Finally, even if Hardy did represent the plaintiffs, the 
record establishes that defendants obtained client information 
concerning plaintiffs' financial condition, personalities, employ-
ment, goals, strategies, and business practices, which was not 
available to other parties with whom plaintiffs did business. 
(Appellant's Brief, at 46-49.) While some information was publicly 
available from the FCC, defendants knew much more about plaintiffs 
than could have been discerned from review of a public record, and 
their personal knowledge of the plaintiffs meant they knew how to 
exploit the information they had. Knowing plaintiffs' vulner-
abilities gave Northstar/Allstate leverage and the ability to 
exploit plaintiffs' and their business opportunity. The extent and 
egregiousness of defendants' breaches strongly imply the misuse of 
that confidential information. It is inconceivable that defendants 
would not have used the information for their own benefit and that 
of their other clients. The alleged involvement of other counsel 
does not relieve Wiley, Rein & Fielding of its duty to maintain 
plaintiffs' confidences and not to use those confidences against 
them. It also did not relieve Wiley, Rein & Fielding of the duty 
of loyalty affirmatively to protect, which it clearly breached. 
-14-
POINT II 
DUTIES OWED AND BREACHED 
Although admitting for purposes of this motion that they had 
a conflict of interest, defendants spend substantial time in their 
brief attempting to deny or at least justify their misconduct. 
Defendants owed plaintiffs the following duties: 
First, they owed a duty of full disclosure and informed con-
sent concerning any adverse representation.10 Defendants concede 
at page 5 of their Brief a factual dispute concerning breach of 
their duty of full disclosure and informed consent on their deci-
sion to represent Northstar/Allstate against plaintiffs. This de-
cision occurred at least by June 11, 1986. (See supra footnote 1.) 
Second, defendants owed plaintiffs a duty of loyalty. Because 
defendants breached their duty of full disclosure and informed 
consent, they could never have obtained an informed and valid 
consent to the adverse representation. Defendants' duty of loyalty 
10In Stansbury v. Schroeder. 226 Neb. 492, 412 N.W.2d 447, 499 (1987) (quoting 
Ishmael v. Millington. 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal Rptr. 592, 595-96 (1966)), cited 
by defendants, the court explained: 
The loyalty he owes one client cannot consume that owed to the other. 
Most descriptions of professional conduct prohibit his undertaking to 
represent conflicting interests at all; or demand that he terminate the 
three-way relationship when adversity of interest appears. Occasional 
statements sanction informed representation of divergent interest in 
"exceptional" situations. Even those statements demand complete 
disclosure of all facts and circumstances which, in the attorney's 
honest judgment, may influence the client's choice, holding the 
attorney civilly liable for loss caused by lack of disclosure. 
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to plaintiffs, arising from years of legal representation, thus 
remained intact and unchanged. 
The duty of loyalty had two components. The first component 
was an affirmative duty to protect plaintiffs7 interests and 
anticipate the adverse and detrimental plans of others (including 
Northstar/Allstate). The second component was a duty not to advise 
or direct any persons with whom plaintiffs transacted business in 
a manner which would or could impair plaintiffs7 interests. After 
defendants failed to obtain consent to represent Northstar vis-a-
vis plaintiffs, defendants admittedly were loyal to Northstar/ 
Allstate and disloyal to plaintiffs. Clearly, defendants7 failure 
to affirmatively protect plaintiffs7 interests and defendants7 
representation of Northstar/Allstate against plaintiffs breached 
both components of the loyalty duty. 
Third, defendants owed plaintiffs the separate duty of confid-
entiality. That duty strictly prohibited the use of any confid-
ential information obtained during the representation for the 
benefit of defendants or their other clients. There is no conceiv-
able way that defendants could represent both Northstar and the 
plaintiffs in the same transaction without breaching this duty. 
A. Consequences of the Breaches of Duties of Loyalty. 
Defendants7 conclusion that it was Northstar/Allstate7s con-
duct, and not theirs, which caused plaintiffs7 damages, is incor-
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rect. Defendants mistakenly argue they are not responsible for any 
damages caused by the predatory business decisions of their other 
clients. They imply that the business world is a war, it's risky, 
and one who enters the fray must be prepared to accept losses. One 
risk plaintiffs did not assume, nor were they required to under the 
rules of engagement, however, was that their own lawyers would 
defect, and would assist their adversary to defeat plaintiffs while 
preserving a facade of continuing to protect plaintiffs' interests 
as always before. The problem with defendants' conclusion is that 
defendants owed plaintiffs the dual duty of loyalty--the 
affirmative duty to protect and anticipate, and the duty not to 
assist another client in a manner which impaired plaintiffs' 
interests. The law, defendants' concessions and the undisputed 
evidence establish these duties. 
Defendants cite two cases, Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 
157 Cal. App. 3d 59, 203 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984), and Franko v. 
Mitchell. 158 Ariz. 391, 762 P.2d 1345 (Ariz. App. 1988), for the 
proposition that they are not liable for the conduct of their 
clients. These cases, and defendants' argument, miss the point. 
Plaintiffs do not attempt to hold defendants liable for the conduct 
of their clients. Rather defendants' conduct in breaching their 
duty of loyalty left plaintiffs exposed and permitted defendants 
and their other clients to take unfair advantage of plaintiffs. 
-17-
Purdy makes this very point by contrasting the facts of a more 
analogous case. In Purdy plaintiff claimed the attorney had 
negligently failed to persuade his insurer to settle a claim within 
policy limits. There was no allegation of a breach of the 
attorney's duty of loyalty to the insured, only that the lawyer had 
negligently failed to "effectuate settlement." Most significantly, 
however, u[t]here were no allegations in the . . . cause of action 
against the lawyer defendants of conspiracy or of the commission of 
any intentional torts." By contrast, the Purdy court cited Betts 
v. Allstate Ins. Co.r 154 Cal. App. 3d 688, 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 
535-36 (1984): 
In Betts, it was found that "The lawyers failed Betts by 
(1) lack of disclosure and sound advice; (2) after the 
excess verdict, when the conflict of interest was 
unmistakeable, actively working to protect Allstate and 
persisting in manipulating Betts against her own best 
interests; (3) assisting in manufacturing a false record 
against the time when a bad faith lawsuit might be 
instituted; (4) rather than advising consultation of 
independent counsel as possible or desirable, resisting 
the efforts of such counsel to become informed when 
finally retained; (5) discouraging Betts' assignment of 
rights in exchange for personal release and influencing 
her instead in the direction of bankrupty." 
(Emphasis supplied.) In Bettsr there was an unmistakeable breach 
of the duty of loyalty in protecting the interests of Allstate over 
and against the interests of Betts. Defendants' conduct here in 
protecting the interests of Northstar over and against the in-
terests of plaintiffs creates the identical causal relationship. 
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Franko is similarly distinguishable. There, the court found 
no cause of action by a non-client could be maintained absent a 
duty, such as xxa unique fiduciary relationship." 762 P.2d at 1354. 
Such a relationship clearly existed here. 
Plaintiffs have established, and defendants have not denied, 
that defendants, as lawyers for Northstar/Allstate, advised these 
clients on the very matters at issue prior to the clients' taking 
any course of action.11 As a director of Northstar and Farragut, 
Wiley voted in favor of each specific action directed against 
plaintiffs, and the defendants represented Northstar/Allstate in 
implementing those decisions. Yet, defendants owed plaintiffs the 
affirmative duty to protect plaintiffs' interests, and to challenge 
any act or decision of Northstar/Allstate which, in any way, 
conflicted with or impaired plaintiffs' interests.12 
As the lawyer for Northstar/Allstate and as director of 
Northstar and Farragut, Wiley and his Firm were in a position to 
influence decisions consistent with plaintiffs' interests, even if 
The Wiley Firm's time records are telling. At each critical juncture, the 
Wiley Firm researched and advised these other clients before the clients followed 
the suggested course of action, which in every instance injured plaintiffs. 
(Appellants' Brief, at 12-23.) 
12Indeed, after the squeezedown, defendants' ongoing duties of full disclosure 
informed consent, loyalty, and confidentiality to the plaintiffs arose due also to 
plaintiffs' status as limited partners of MWT, Ltd. Margulies v. Upchurch, 6 96 P.2d 
1195 (Utah 1985). Defendants' adverse representation of Northstar and MWT, Ltd. 
against plaintiffs' interests following the squeezedown (Appellants' brief at 15-23) 
clearly breached these duties, which further assured defendants' losses. 
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they were adverse to the interests of Northstar/Allstate. He never 
spoke in defense of plaintiffs' interests, however, while he was 
advocating the interests of Northstar/Allstate. Rather, he 
directly assisted these clients to undermine plaintiffs7 interests. 
He then obtained indemnity from Allstate to protect him and his 
Firm against their own breaches of their duties to plaintiffs. 
By being in both camps and representing conflicting interests, 
Mr. Wiley was forced to choose between which clients he would 
protect and which he would forsake, because the nature of the 
transaction prevented him from protecting both. He opted to pro-
tect the wealthier and more prestigious clients whom he repre-
sented, on whose boards he sat and in whom he held a financial 
stake. 
B. Additional Consequences of Defendants' Breaches of 
Fiduciary Duty, 
The further consequences of defendants' conduct are not as 
defendants represent. The evidence clearly establishes that 
defendants' conduct was a substantial factor in their losses, and 
that but for defendants' conduct, there would have been a better 
result. 
(1) NORTHSTAR COMMITMENT: Northstar made a commitment 
of $10 million. Without a commitment from Northstar, plaintiffs 
never would have accepted Wood's advice to turn down CPL's 
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commitment. Joe Lee, David Lee, Clayton Foulger, and Jo-Ann Wong 
Kilpatrick testified that Northstar had committed $10 million based 
on the representations of Wood, their attorney. (R. 4969, 4972-73, 
4985, 5049-51, 5102-04, 5115, 5203-04, 5245-46; £££ Appellants' 
Brief, at 8-10.) 
It was Wood who advised plaintiffs to accept Northstar's $10 
million commitment and reject the CPL commitment. He advised 
plaintiffs that Northstar had committed $10 million, and he was the 
one who telephoned CPL to say that plaintiffs would go with 
Northstar/Allstate.13 (Appellants' Brief, at 11.) The record shows 
that during the squeezedown, Mr. Wood was angered that over $3 
million of the commitment had "vanished." (Id. at 8-15.) In 
response to accusations that he had been disloyal to Northstar in 
attempting to ameliorate the obvious damage the adverse represen-
tations caused plaintiffs during the squeezedown, Wood stated: 
Certainly my consultation with the Mountain West princi-
pals on the subject of our representation of Northstar 
did not include a warning that we would operate in an 
unprofessional fashion on behalf of Northstar in order to 
gain an advantage for Northstar over Mountain West.... 
If, in fact, Wood's representations and inducements concerning the 
Northstar commitment had been untrue, such a misrepresentation clearly would have 
caused plaintiffs substantial injury. They rejected the CPL commitment based on 
that representation. Having effectively taken away any opportunity for 
plaintiffs to accept that commitment, defendants now contend there never was such 
an opportunity. There is, at the very least, a genuine issue of material fact in 
this regard. 
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Finally, your January 9 memorandum raises the question of 
my comments at approximately 3 a.m. on November 15 on the 
subject of the $3,000,000 that had vanished from the 
draft Partnership Agreement and Credit Agreement shortly 
before. Without belaboring the matter, it is obvious 
that everyone was tired and tempers were short. . . . 
Moreover, the problem was of a magnitude that it was 
producing a complete break-down of trust in Northstar and 
WR&F. It was not in the interest of the firm or 
Northstar to take clearly untenable positions as to the 
representations that had been made to induce the 
[plaintiffs] to negotiate with Northstar at that level, 
or the fact that the prior documents reflected those 
representations. Nor do I aspire to practice law on the 
hidden ball technique of negotiations, particularly when 
it is used in as sensitive a situation as this one. 
(R. 6464, 6471.) There is at least a genuine issue of material 
fact whether, had defendants not breached their duties, plaintiffs 
could have enforced the commitment against Northstar. 
(2) CPL COMMITMENT: CPL made a commitment of $11 mil-
lion. (Appellants7 Brief at 9.) CPL's experience in the telecom-
munications industry dwarfed that of Northstar. (R. 7056.) CPL 
was an experienced and sophisticated company owning five television 
properties. As Wood explained in a July 14, 1986 letter to 
plaintiffs, some time before CPL made its commitment: 
The Dallas people [CPL] are very interested. Their 
broadcaster investor has 5 TV stations already, with 
independent station (as opposed to network) experience in 
2 of them. One of his U.H.F. independents makes more 
money than at least one of the affiliates. 
(Id.; Appellants7 Brief, at 8-10.) 
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The terms of CPL's later commitment, which were memorialized 
in CPL's "Memorandum of Understanding/7 showed that CPL had com-
mitted to put up financing of $11 million. (R. 7065-94.) Based on 
CPL's representations of what it could and would do, CPL's managing 
partner explained: 
You will notice that we have designed a $10 million 
financing arrangement that will provide all of the money 
that we project is necessary for this venture, plus 
another $1 million of a contingency reserve. Of this 
financing, the Mountain West Principals would be required 
to convert their existing investment into preferred stock 
of the continuing company, plus perhaps a nominal amount 
in common stock. Communications Partners would be 
responsible for arranging all the rest of the financing. 
(R. 7091.)14 Based on Wood's representations concerning CPL's 
financial strength, there is no doubt CPL could have performed 
under its commitment. Had plaintiffs been given the right to make 
an informed decision to go with CPL or with another financing 
source, the record shows at least a genuine issue of material fact 
on the reasonable likelihood that plaintiffs would have been able 
to buy out the other applicants, obtain the license, put the 
14Defendants assert that CPL's "proposal" was for $2 million not $10 million. 
(Appellees' Brief, at 12.) Defendants' claim in this regard is one of their more 
outrageous distortions of the record. Defendants are careful to state that CPL had 
committed only $2 million of its own money, which, defendants claim, would never 
have closed the deal with competing applicants. What defendants fail to disclose, 
however, is that CPL was prepared to finance the remainder of its commitment. The 
implication is that somehow CPL's money would not have worked as well as Northstar's 
in obtaining the Channel 13 license and in putting the station in operation. 
As it turned out, a significant portion of the reduced Northstar/Allstate 
commitment was financed by notes to buy out competing applicants. See, e.g. . 
Defendants' Addendum, Exhibits 13 and 14. 
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station into operation and realize an interest valued at over $20 
million in the station. (R. 6119; Appellants' Brief, at 23-24, 37-
39)15 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's summary judgment is inconsistent with 
plaintiffs' right to have all facts and inferences drawn in their 
favor. Plaintiffs were entitled to submit these claims to a finder 
of fact. For these reasons, the trial court's order of summary 
judgment must be reversed, and the case remanded for trial. 
DATED this day of June, 1995. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Reec 
Gordon R. Hall 
Rex E. Madsen 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
Attorneys for Appellants 
15CPL's commitment was no more viable than Northstar's only if defendants 
falsely assume that CPL would somehow have taken the same unfair advantage of 
plaintiffs. There is no evidence to this effect. Plaintiffs' clearly would have 
been much better off by accepting CPL's commitment. 
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